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NOTES
THE USE OF THE INJUNCTION TO PREVENT CRrmE IN CASES IN-
VOLVING HOUSES OF ILL FAmE, GAmBLING HOUSES,
BULL FIGHTS, PRIZE FIGHTS, AND SALOoNs.*
The overwhelming weight of authority declares that a court
of equity is not a court of criminal jurisdiction.' Its scope,
unless enlarged by statute, has in the past been largely confined
to the protection of property rights2 and of the civil rights of
the public at large.3 While equity has refused to enjoin the
commission of crimes, as such, its jurisdiction to abate public
nuisances is unquestioned, 4 and it will enjoin such nuisances
although the act constituting the nuisance be also a crime.5 The
scope of this paper is to inquire into some of the cases involving
public nuisances which affect the public morality and decency
and which are also crimes; to examine the state of, and reasons
for the law; and to see if the present trend of courts of equity
to enjoin the commission of certain crimes, under the guise of
enjoining acts that are public nuisances and which are also
crimes, is sound and desirable. For this purpose the following
classes of cases will be looked into: those involving (a) houses of
ill fame, gambling houses; (b) bull and prize fights; (c) saloons.
* This is the third of a series of notes on the Use of the Injunction
to Prevent Crime.
In the consideration of this problem the following citations will be
of aid: Mack, "The Revival of Criminal Equity," 16 Harv. L. Rev. 389;
Dunbar, "Government by Injunction," 13 Law Q. Rev. 347; Chafee,
"The Progress of the Law," 34 Harv. L. Rev. 338; Black, "The Expan-
sion of Criminal Equity Under Prohibition," 5 Wis. L. Rev. 412;
Schofield, "Equity Jurisdiction to Abate and Enjoin Illegal Saloons as
Public Nuisances," S Ill. L. Rev. 19; Walsh on Equity, 197-201; Clark
on Equity, section 244; 2 Story Eq. Jur. (11th ed.), sees. 921-925.
1 Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns, Ch. 371.
2 Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Repr. 670 (1818).
SState v. Patterson, 14 Civ. (Tex.) 465, 37 S. W. 478 (1891).
,'It has been held that the jurisdiction of equity to enjoin public
nuisances is an exception to the rule that equity has no jurisdiction
In cases of crimes and declares that there are but three classes of
nuisances which equity will enjoin, namely: "1. To restrain purprestures
of public highways and navigation. 2. To restrain threatened nuisances
dangerous to the health of the whole community. 3. To restrain ultra
vires acts of corporations injurious to public right." State v. Uhrig, 14
Mo. App.. 413.
5 Ann. Cas. 1914A 440; State v. Ellis, 201 Ala. 295, 78 S. 71.
K. L. J.-10
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(a) Houses of Ill Fame, Gambling Houses.
A bawdy house, or other disorderly house, is generally con-
sidered to be a nuisance both at common law and by statute ;G
and is a nuisance per se in Edison v. Ramseyj In that case an
action was brought to abate a public nuisance, arising out of the
operation of three lewd houses, of which the defendant's was
one. it was held, that as a lewd house is a nuisance per se a
court of equity has jurisdiction to abate it in a suit by the attor-
ney general, without alleging a special property injury. The
case was reversed, however, for misjoinder of parties defendant.
In People v. Clark,s the attorney general brought an action
against Nellie Clark for keeping a disorderly house, alleging
that it was frequented by lewd women, that prostitution was
practiced, that lewd and licentious persons gathered there, all
of which was a public nuisance detrimental to the morals and
welfare of the public generally. It was held, that the state may
enjoin the keeping of a bawdy house, though it also constitutes
a crime, where it affects the public welfare and, "this is particu-
larly true when the ordinary method of prosecution of the crimi-
nal offense proves ineffective." 9  The court based its decision
upon the right to enjoin a nuisance affecting the public welfare,
saying that the basis for this jurisdiction is ancient and based
upon the fact that courts of equity can give a more complete
remedy than is obtainable at law.
In state v. Yoiung 1° it was held that the state may enjoin
the maintenance of a bawdy house independently of a statute,
for ". . . . at the time of the adoption of the constitution
and for many years before, courts of equity in England and
America exercised jurisdiction for the suppression of nuisances,
public as well as private."
0 People v. Smith, 275 I1. 256, 114 N. E. 31; King v. Dixon, 10 Mod.
335; Chase v. Revere, 232 Mass. 88, 122 N. E. 162.
7146 Ga. 767, 92 S. E. 513; State v. EZZis, 201 Ala. 295, 78 S. 71.
8 268 Ill. 156, 108 N. E. 994.
9108 N. E. 996.
1054 Mont. 401, 170 Pac. 947; State v. Ellis, 201 Ala. 295, 78 S. 71,
Accord. There a bill was brought to enjoin the use of property used
for a house of ill fame as a public nuisance, on the ground that it was
the source of venereal infection and disease, was a menace to the
health of the community, tending to corrupt its morals and to pro-
mote vice. It was enjoined on the ground that it was a public nuisance
at common law, and it was immaterial that such maintenance might
be punished by the law courts as a crime. No statute was involved in
this case.
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State v. Ryder11 was an action brought to abate a bawdy
house under a statute declaring such to be a public nuisance
and that on proof of a house being used for such purpose an
injunction would be directed against it. The court held the
statute constitutional that gave equity jurisdiction in this type
of case. "This jurisdiction is grounded upon the greater
efficacy and promptitude of the remedies administered in such
actions, enabling the court to restrain nuisances that are
threatened or in progress, as well as to abate those already in
existence, and to effect their final suppression by injunction,
which will often also prevent a multiplicity of suits."
A gambling house was a nuisance at common law, ".
not only because they were deemed great temptations to idleness,
but also because they were apt to draw together great numbers
of disorderly persons."' 12
In Respass v. Contmonwealtlb13 three actions were brought
and tried together, for each involved the same question. In each
it was alleged that the defendants were operating a gambling
house, pool room and handbook; that these places were fre-
quented by gamblers, criminals and other low and dissolute
characters, all of which had a detrimental effect on the morals
of the community and constituted a public nuisance. It was
further alleged that this nuisance has continued for years,
despite the fact that the criminal courts had prosecuted and
convicted the offenders; the parties having changed their names
and moved elsewhere. The court enjoined the use of the property
so as to constitute a public nuisance, declaring that "the chan-
(.ellor will not enjoin the mere commission of a crime; but,
when property is used in such a way as to become a nuisance,
the continuance of this nuisance may be enjoined. ,14
Further, "If the use of the property is such as to require that
it should be restrained by injunction, the chancellor's jurisdic-
tion is not affected by the fact that the use may also be a crim-
inal offense.'' 15 This nuisance affected the morals of the com-
munity and the state is interested in the character of its people,
for "the character of a state depends upon the character of
n 126 Minn. 95, 147 N. W. 953.
" Ex parte Pirotti, 43 Nev. 243, 246, 184 Pac. 209.
"1131 Ky. 807, 115 S. W. 1131.
21131 Ky. 813.
Is Ibid.
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the individuals constituting it. If the people become depraved,
the state cannot long exist. To say that a court of
equity may not enjoin a nuisance of this sort, when the criminal
laws have proven inadequate, is to say that the Commonwealth
is unable to protect its citizens."16 The court goes on ". . . the
jurisdiction of the courts of equity in regard to public nuisances
may be traced back to the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and may
be exercised where the nuisance affects the health, morality or
safety of the community; the ground of jurisdiction being the
ability of the chancellor to give a more complete and perfect
remedy than is obtainable at law by arresting the nuisance that
is in progress and protecting the public against it by perpetual
injunction."17
A gambling house has been held a public nuisance per se,
though not so conducted as to amount to a breach of the peace.' 8
To summarize class (a) -we find that houses of ill fame and
gambling houses are generally held public nuisances, either at
common law or by statute, and that the jurisdiction of equity is
unquestioned in such ,cases so far as the public health and safety
is concerned, though the minority view objects to any but the
common law type of nuisance. The writer believes it is correct to
exclude the protection of the public morals from the courts of
equity, even though a nuisance involving such be made out, on
the ground that such should be confined exclusively to the
criminal jurisdiction. Once a public nuisance is made out
equity assumes jurisdiction and it is immaterial that the acts
constituting the nuisance be also crimes. It is to be noted that
in all of these cases the thing enjoined is the use made of prop-
erty.
(b) Bull and Prize Fights.
In State v. Canty' s the attorney general brought an action
Ibid., 815.
'- 131 Ky. 814; supra, note 13. Contra, State v. Rhrlick, 65 W. Va.
700, 64 S. E. 935: Immorality alone being held insufficient basis for
injunction. "If we should sustain this injunction on the ground that
the act is immoral as well as criminal, we should be bound to award
it in all criminal cases, for, in every instance, there is some reason,
affecting the body politic, for prohibiting acts and making the com-
mission criminal, and soon there would be no distinction between
courts of law and courts of equity in respect to criminal jurisdiction."
This objection is sound, it is submitted.
"R8hrick v. Uommonwealth, 125 Ky. 742, 102 S. W. 389.
11207 Mo. 439, 105 S. W. 1078, 15 L. R. A. N. S. 747.
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in equity to enjoin the defendants from giving a bull fight in
an arena built for this purpose. It was alleged that the exhibi-
tion would bring together large numbers of the lawless, cause
riots and affrays to the prejudice of the public peace and wel-
fare; that such an exhibition was offensive to good morals, con-
stituted a continuing violation of the law and was a public nuis-
ance, for which the state has no adequate remedy at law. It
was held, that a bull fighting arena in which fights are carried
on in the presence of a large numbers of people is a public
nuisance, 20 and the arena may be abated by injunction as injuri-
ous to the public safety and morals; it being immaterial that the
offenders were amenable to the criminal laws also, or that prop-
erty rights were not involved. The requirement that property
rights must be affected before equity will issue an injunction
has no application to proceedings (by the state) to abate a public
nuisance. 21 Only the use of the property was enjoined, though
two of the judges thought that the principals should also be
restrained.2 2 The court deemed the legal remedy inadequate,
as there had been several prosecutions of these defendants but
no convictions.
In Comm onwealth v. McGovern23 an action was brought to
restrain the holding of a prize fight advertised to take place
Sept. 22, 1902, in the Auditorium in Louisville, between
McGovern and Young Corbett; alleging that if the fight was
allowed to take place many criminals and disorderly persons
would be brought together, producing breaches of the peace and
have a demoralizing effect on the good order and well being of
the community, constituting a public nuisance for which the
Commonwealth has no adequate remedy at law. There was a
Any act which is an offense against the public order,
common good, and public decency or morals, or any public exhibition
which tends to corrupt the morals, disturb the peace, or the general
good order and welfare of society . . . and all and any exhibitions,
the natural tendency of which is to pander to the vicious and dis-
orderly members of society . . " is a public nuisance. 105 S. W.
1081.
1105 S. W. 1084. This requirement applies only when the com-
plainant Is an individual; no question as to damage being involved in
a public proceeding to abate a public nuisance. "The question simply
is whether there has been an invasion of public right, irrespective of
the question of pecuniary damage." Smith v. McDowel, 148 Ill. 51,
35 N. E. 141, 22 L. R. A. 393.
- 105 S. W. 1078, 1084-85.
116 Ky. 212, 75 S. W. 261, 66 L. R. A. 280.
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statute making prize fighting a felony and requiring the courts
to prevent and suppress prize fights, for which purpose they
could exercise all of the powers vested in them for the preven-
tion of crimes and misdemeanors. The court enjoined the prop-
erty owner from permitting a prize fight to take place on his
property, -such being a public nuisance dangerous to the public
morals and safety, although the act would be also a crime. The
state did not need a property right when it sought to restrain
a public nuisance on property of an individual. The statute did
not govern this case for it did not confer any extended jurisdic-
tion on courts of equity to restrain this type of act.
Attorney General v. Fitzsimmons2 4 involved similar facts.
An injunction was sought to restrain the Corbett-Fitzsimmons
fight, alleging that in open defiance of the law the promoters
advertised the fight would take place for a prize and the worlds
championship, that 50,000 people were expected to attend and
seats for that number would be provided, that the lives of the
participants would be endangered and a lawless, dangerous
assemblage of persons would be brought together causing riots
and affrays, all of which would endanger lives and property
generally and constitute a public nuisance. The court enjoined
the holding of the fight as a public nuisance. "Courts of equity
will not, generally, interfere by injunction to prevent the com-
mission of ordinary crimes, and this upon the principle that an
adequate remedy exists at law 5-yet where the crime arises
from, or is a constituent part of a public nuisance, they should
not fail to exercise their extraordinary powers to abate the nuis-
ance. .... 26 The court admitted that a court of equity could
not administer punitive justice (except as a punishment for
contempt) but declared it could administer preventive justice
in proper cases, of which the instant case was one. So here the
" 35 Am. Law Reg. (n. s.) 100, 1 Ames Cas. In Eq. Jurisd. 622,
Ark. (1896).
2 The court concluded that the remedy at law was inadequate
since the demurrer to the bill admitted that the bond to keep the peace
would not prevent the fight. See State v. Hobart, 8 Ohio n. p. 246.
2135 Am. L. Reg. (n. s.) 105. For the power to abate the nuisance
involves the jurisdiction to make all orders necessary to effectuate
the order for prevention or abatement, and this involves jurisdiction
to enjoin the commission of a crime which inheres in and constitutes
a part of the nuisance.
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court restrained not only the use of property but also the princi-
pals.
The court in Columbian Athletic Club v. State2 7 not only
granted an injunction to prevent a prize fight but also put the
corporation's property into the hands of a receiver in order to
prevent it. The facts were that the defendant repeatedly held
prize fights on the corporate property and proposed to hold an-
other, all of which were public nuisances, to restrain which the
injunction was issued notwithstanding the acts were also
crimes.2 8
To summarize class (b) we find that when the use to be
made of property is the holding of a bull fight or prize fight, it
will be enjoined as a public nuisance, injurious to the public
safety. That the same act would be a crime will not defeat a
court of equity of jurisdiction. This seems to be sound. But
to enjoin the principals, as one case did, seems unsound so far
as they are not enjoined from making use of their property as to
constitute a public nuisance. One court even ordered the cor-
porate property placed in the hands of a receiver to give effect
to its restraining order preventing a prize fight. This, it is
submitted, is erroneous, for when a corporation acts ultra vires
the state has an adequate remedy at law, in a suit to oust the
corporation's charter.
(c) Saloons.
In State v. Crawford2 9 an action was brought under a
Kansas statute declaring all places where intoxicating liquors
are manufactured, sold, etc., to be public nuisances, and to be
abated by the sheriff upon the judgment of a court having juris-
diction declaring such a place to be a public nuisance. It was
alleged that liquors were sold on the premises in open defiance
of the law and constituted such a nuisance. An injunction was
denied by the cou-t on the ground that the statute provided
another and apparently adequate remedy in abatement by the
sheriff. There was dictum that ". . . every place where
a public statute is openly, publicly, repeatedly, continuously,
persistently and intentionally violated is a public nuisance
. independently of the express terms of the statute declar-
2 143 Ind. 98, 40 N. E. 914.
-' 15 L. R. A. N. S. 747, note.
2S Kans. 518, 42 Am. Rep. 182 (1882).
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ing them to be such. "30 The result of this case, that if the stat-
ute makes it illegal it thus becomes a public nuisance and if the
law provides no adequate remedy equity will provide one by
injunction, is to make possible the result pointed out in State v.
Ehrlick3l and Hedden v. Hand.3 2
In State v. Uhrig33 a proceeding in the nature of an infor-
mation in equity was brought to enjoin the keeping of an
unlicensed dramshop on the ground that it was a public
nuisance. An injunction was denied, though this was a public
ruisance, for it was not dangerous to the public health, one of
the common law exceptions34 to the rule, that public nuisances
were crimes at common law and hence to enjoin them was to
deprive the defendant of his right to trial by jury.
State v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 35 held ". . . a court of equity
has jurisdiction to enjoin the violation by a railroad corporation
of the act of 1909, which forbids intoxication and the drinking
oll intoxicating liquors upon railroad trains",3 6 on the ground
that such was an ultra vires act of the corporation and consti-
tuted a public nuisance. Accordingly, an injunction issued,
though no property rights were violated, for the court deemed
them unnecessary. The case must rest upon the ground that
the statute did not provide for an adequate remedy at law, but
the court did not so hold. The protection of the public comfort
and safety being, apparently, deemed sufficient.
In Hedden v. Hand37 an action was brought under a
statute giving courts of equity jurisdiction over certain classes
of nuisances. The lower court granted an injunction to restrain
the defendant from using his property for a bawdy house and
for the illegal sale of liquor, as to constitute a public nuisance.
This was reversed, however, on the ground that the keeping of
a disorderly house was a public nuisance and a crime at common
law, punishable and abatable in courts of criminal jurisdiction,
and a statute making it punishable and abatable in equity
"28 Kans., 522.
"Supra, note 17.
"Infra, note 38; 107 Atl. 285, 290.
3114 Mo. App. 413. Overruled' by State v. Canty, supra, note 19.
Supra, note 4, exception 2.
88 Nebr. 669, 30 N. W. 295.
3 Syllabus, par. 4.
"90 N. J. Eq. 583, 107 Atl. 285 (1919), 5 A. L. R. 1463.
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deprived the defendant of his right of trial by jury, conse-
quently the statute was void. The court said:
"No instance can be found in the English reports, nor in the reports
of this country, in states where the common law prevailed and still
prevails, where a court of equity has ever taken cognizance of a case
of a public nuisance founded purely on moral turpitude.
"It is clear that if the Legislature may bestow on the Court of
Chancery jurisdiction to grant an injunction and abate a public nuis-
ance of a purely criminal nature, then there can be no valid argument
against the power of the Legislature to confide the entire Criminal
Code of this state to a court of equity for enforcement.""
This criticism by the court points out a real danger and is sound,
it is submitted.39
Carleton v. Rugg40 is also a case brought under a statute
giving certain courts jurisdiction in equity to abate a nuisance.
An injunction was issued against the property, on the showing
by ten legal voters, that it was used for the sale of intoxicating
liquors and was therefore a public nuisance. The statute was
held to be constitutional. 41 The fact that the act which is the
nuisance is also a crime does not prevent equity from abating
it, because the injunction acts on the property and its use
amounting to a public nuisance, and not on the person of the
defendant.
At the time of Stead v. Fortner,42 Illinois had a local option
law. The facts are: that formerly the township of Shelby and
the town of Shelbyville, located therein, were dry, then the
former voted to restore liquor but the city held no election and
thus remained dry. The 'city fathers' thought the city was now
wet and passed an ordinance to license the sales of liquor. The
defendant was one of the licensees. The attorney general
brought to restrain the defendant from selling liquor, praying
that the property be declared a common nuisance and abated.
The court declared that a court of equity has jurisdiction to
abate a public nuisance, though the offenders are amenable to
the criminal laws; further, when the state seeks an injunction
to abate a public nuisance it needs no property rights
3, 107 Atl. 285, 290.
- 34 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 400.
0149 Mass. 550, 22 N. E. 55, 5 A. L. R. 193.
11 The constitutionality of such statutes is discussed below.
255 Ill. 468, 99 N. E. 680. Criticized in 8 Ill. L. Rev. 19.
KiTuCmy LAW JouENAL
infringed, 43 though if the suit be brought by a private person,
he must have.
In Mugler v. Kansas44 the petitioner sought to enjoin the
defendants from using certain property as a place where intoxi-
cating liquors were manufactured and sold in violation of a
Kansas statute declaring it to be a misdemeanor for any one
to sell liquors without obtaining a license, and that every place
where it is sold in violation of the statute shall be deemed a
public nuisance and abated. This particular defendant owned
a brewery. His defense was that said statute was unconstitu-
tional, in that it violated the due process clause of the XIV
Amendment. The court, however, overruled the objection, hold-
ing that the state has the power to declare any place where
liquor is sold to be a public nuisance under its police power.45
The injunction issued, and the basis was stated to be the ability
of courts of equity to give a more speedy, effecutal and perma-
nent remedy than can be had at law.46
CONSTITUTIONAmTy OF STATUTES
The jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin a public
nuisance at the suit of the state was upheld in the absence of
a statute conferring express jurisdiction.47 A state which would
so hold would uphold a statute conferring on equity power to
abate and enjoin a nuisance which was also a crime.48 And
with the exception of Hedden v. Hand4 9 other courts have uni-
"At page 683 of 99 N. E. it is said, ". . . this court has never
regarded a criminal prosecution which can only dispose of an existing
nuisance, and cannot prevent a renewal of the nuisance, for which a
new prosecution must be brought, as a complete and adequate remedy
for a wrong inflicted on the public. The public authorities have a
right to institute the suit when the general public welfare demands it
and damages to the public are not susceptible of computation. The
maintenance of the public health, morals, safety, and welfare is on a
plane above mere pecuniary damage, although not susceptible of
measurement in money; and to say that a court of equity may not
enjoin a public nuisance because property rights are not involved
would be to say that the state is unable to enforce the law or protect
its citizens from public wrongs."
123 U. S. 263, 31 L. Ed. 205.
431 L. Ed. 210.
10 31 L. Ed. 214. Many courts give this as a basis of jurisdiction
and cite 2 Story Eq. Jur., sections 921, 923, 924, 925.
4"1Stead v. Fortner, supra, note 42; 5 A. L. R. 1474.
- People v. Smith, supra, note 6.
0 Supra, note 37.
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formly upheld the validity of similar statutes, although no
property rights be involved.50 (1) The constitutional point
chiefly stressed by the opponents of these statutes is that they
deprive the defendant of the constitutional right of trial by
jury, but, with the exception of Hedden v. Hand,51 this conten-
tion has been overruled.52 "A man charged with the commission
of a crime has a constitutional right to a trial by jury, but a
man who has not yet acted, but who merely proposes to commit
an act which is not only criminal in its character, but also
flagrantly offensive as a public nuisance, has no constitutional
right to commit the act in order that he may thereafter enjoy
the constitutional right of trial by jury."15 3 (2) Another objec-
tion is ". . . that by a process in equity for the abatement of
an alleged common nuisance of the kind named in this statute,
they (the attackers) are liable to be deprived of their property,
immunities and privileges otherwise than by the judgment of
their peers or the law of the land. The fallacy of this argument
lies in part in disregarding the distinction between a proceeding
to abate a nuisance, which looks only to the property that in
the use of it constitutes a nuisance, and a proceeding to punish
an offender for the crime of maintaining a nuisance."5' Abate-
ment is a civil proceeding, not a criminal one. 55 "A prohibition
simply on the use of property for purposes that are declared
by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot in any sense, be deemed a
taking or an appropriation of property for public benefit."" 5
(3) The next argument against the validity of these statutes is
that they violate the due process clause. But against this con-
tention is arrayed the great weight of authority ihat it does
not.5 7 Such statutes are a valid exercise of the police power, if
reasonable.';
" 5 A. L. R. 1476 and cases there cited.
5 Supra, note 37.
12 Supra, note 50.
0State v. Canty, supra, note 19; 105 S. W. 1085.
" Carleton v. Rugg, supra, note 40, 22 N. E. 56.
"People v. Ryder, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N. W. 953.
M ugler v. Kansas, supra, note 44.
5 A. L. R. 1584; 49 A. L. R. 641.
"Mugler v. Kansas, supra, note 45, at p. 678.
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SuwtARy OF REASONS FOR AND TiE BASES OF THIS JURISDICTION.
Judge Story concisely summarizes the reasons for and the
bases of this jurisdiction in equity to restrain public nuisances
which are also crimes, as given by the courts, as follows:
"The ground of this jurisdiction of courts of equity In cases of
. . . public nuisances . . . undoubtedly is, their ability to give
a more complete and perfect remedy than is obtainable at law, in order
to prevent irreparable mischief, and also to suppress oppressive and
vexatious litigations. In the first place, they can interpose, where the
courts of law cannot, to restrain and prevent such nuisances, which are
threatened, or are in progress, as well as those already existing. In
the next place, by perpetual injunctions the remedy is made more com-
plete through all future time; whereas, an information or indictment
at the common law can only dispose of the present nuisance; and for
future acts new prosecutions must be brought. In the next place, the
remedial justice in equity may be more prompt and immediate before
irreparable mischief is done; whereas, at law, nothing can be done,
except after a trial, and upon the award of judgment.""9
Other bases are: to prevent a multiplicity of suits;6° to
protect the public health,6 1 morals,62 welfare, 3 and safety; 64
to restrain ultra vires acts of corporations ;65 and on the con-
stitutionality of statutes giving equity extended jurisdiction in
these cases.66
In the writer's opinion the true basis of these cases is
parens patriae. The sovereign was bound of right by his laws
to defend his subjects. 67  He, as parens patriae, always pro-
tected infants and their estates, idiots, lunatics, etc. He dele-
gated the duty of giving protection to these to the keeper of
his conscience, the chancellor, who exercised such in his judicial
capacity in the court of chancery.68 In other words the chan-
cellor exercised the sovereign's role of paren patrias and pro-
tected persons who had no other protector.69 In this country
",2 Story Eq. Jur. (11th ed.) sec. 924; all of which goes to show
that the remedy at law is inadequate. Indeed it seems that the same
reasons are equally applicable in favor of the argument of some that
the entire criminal law should be given to equity for enforcement; this
is not to be tolerated.
"State v. Ryder, supra, note 11.
"Edison v. Ramsey, supra, note 7.
"Respass v. Com'monwealth, supra, note 13.
"People v. Clark, supra, note 8.
'Attorney General v. Fitzsimmons, supra, note 24.
6 State v. 0. B. & Q. By. Co., supra, note 35.NHedden v. Hand, supra, notes 38 et seq.
w11 Hollsworth's History of the English Law 475, note 2.
"Fontain v. Ravenal, 17 How. 369, 15 L. Ed. 80, 85.
= Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435, 438.
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the state has succeeded to the King as sovereign. In Kansas v.
Colorado,7 0 a case involving a public nuisance, the Supreme
Court said that the jurisdiction of equity ". might be
invoked by the state as parens patriae, trustee, guardian, or
representative of all or a considerable portion of its citizens.''7 1
Expediency. The chief inadequacy of the remedy at law
as compared with the remedy in equity is in the fact that in the
former the trials are by jury.7 2 This inadequacy may be attri-
butable to the inefficiency of the criminal law, due to the low
standard of intelligence of our juries, and to the popular elec-
tion of the judiciary and prosecuting attorneys; in this, history
seems to be repeating itself as in the Middle Ages in England
in the time of weak governments.7 3 The injunction holds but
another threat over the head of the prospective criminal, in
addition to that imposed by the criminal law. If the injunction
has a "mysterious potency",74 it lies in this added penalty.
True, the penalty for the crime is for the act done in violation
of the state law, and the penalty imposed for contempt is for
violation of the court's orders and so do not amount to double
jeopardy, yet this does not change the writer's conclusion that
still the penalty is an added one. The criminal law is partly
deterrent, it is submitted,75 so is the injunction. From what
has been said it is apparent that the supposed "efficacy" of the
injunction loses part of its mysterious potency.
Conceding that the remedy at law is often inadequate in
criminal cases, this is no reason why equity should enforce the
criminal law, for it has often been held that the fact that the
criminal law is not enforced is no ground for the interposition
of courts of equity.76 The remedy for this inadequacy, or sup-
posed inadequacy in many cases, lies in the revamping of our
criminal procedure. "Courts of equity can in no event be made
to replace permanently an able and honest administration of its
duties by the executive department of the government. An
attempt to do so may achieve a temporary success, but ulti-
'o185 U. S. 125, 142.
See also 34 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 395.
"13 L. Q. Rev. 347, 395.
16 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 402. Clark on Equity, sec. 244.
See comment in 13 Cal. L. Rev. 63.
5 Wis. L. Rev. 412, 421.
16 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 397.
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mately will result either in a lowering of the standard of the
judiciary or a disregard of its decrees. ' '
To conclude, we find that the almost universal rule is that
if the act will, or does, amount to a public nuisance, the juris-
diction of courts of equity will not be defeated because the
same act is also a crime. Houses of ill fame, gambling houses,
bull and prize fights, and saloons are generally held to be publio
nuisances. As long as the injunction restrains the defendant
in the use he makes, or proposes to make, of his property it is
sound. But when the injunction restrains the person of the
defendant from doing an act which will amount to a crime and
also constitute a public nuisance, if committed, and does not
link this -with the use of property, it is injoining the commission
of crime as such and is not to be tolerated. If, however, the
distinction pointed out in Carleton v. Rugg 3 is adhered to the
restraining order will be limited to the zse made of property
as to constitute a public nuisance. This seems sound.
Lox B. RoGERs.
13 Law Q. Rev. 347, 367.
Supra, note 54.
